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Abstract
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose
period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some
notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on uncoupled and com-
pletely uncoupled learning rules. While the former relies on players being aware of
only their own payoff functions and able to monitor the action taken by the others, the
latter assumes that players only know their own past realized payoffs. We highlight the
border between possible and impossible results using these rules. We also overview
several uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules, most of which leverage
notions of regret as the solution concept to seek payoff-improving action profiles.
1 Introduction
One of active and interesting research areas in game theory addresses rules and procedures
to find equilibria in a repeated play of a game. This area has received many attentions in
the course of the last two decades both in economics (e.g., [10, 17] and references therein)
and different disciplines of engineering (e.g., [25, 9, 20]).
In this paper, we consider repeated play of a finite game and overview learning rules
whose period by period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some
notion of equilibria of the underlying stage game. So far a plethora of such rules has been
investigated and they can be categorized with respect to their degree of rationality and
cognitive optimization.
A large class of such learning rules constitutes simple and natural rules, also referred
to as “adaptive heuristics” (see e.g. [17]), whose rationality requirement is less than that
of complicated rules (i.e. those that require decision making via certain Bayesian beliefs)
and also higher than that of evolutionary dynamics. By simplicity we require the rule to
be implemented easily (in terms of time and computation complexity, etc.), which implies
that it can be implemented by players who have bounded rationality. By natural we mean
that the learning rule should be devised for a natural situation in which each player can
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monitor the actions taken by other players and knows her payoff function but not the
payoff of the others. This setup, to be defined precisely later, is called uncoupledness. Yet,
there is another setup, complete uncoupledness, which is more confined and preserves the
privacy of players in the sense that no player can observe the action taken by the others.
This setup is sometimes called “the case of unknown game” as each player views the game
as a black box. This setting is closely related to adversarial (nonstochastic) multi-armed
bandit problem (see e.g. [1, 6]) in which a player, who plays against an adversary, is
unaware of the payoff functions involved in the game (including her own payoff) as well as
the action taken by the adversary. What she knows is her choice of actions and her own
earned payoffs.
Although sophisticated rules might yield a more elegant behavior (in terms of con-
vergence speed, efficiency of equilibria, etc.) in engineering disciplines as they might be
exploited by smart players, only hardly could such rules capture the underlying models
in game-theoretic interactions between humans, mutants, etc. It should be emphasized,
however, that even in engineering disciplines, there is the curse of dimensionality with
sophisticated rules and indeed many of them cannot be realized even by smart players.
Amongst such rules one can mention those that require the entire history of play to be
taken into account when playing the game. Such a rule may be realized using some au-
tomata whose number of states can grow without bound as the game progresses.
In this overview paper, we address simple and uncoupled learning rules that when
employed for a repeated play of game, their period-by-period behavior probabilities or
empirical distributions converge (in some sense) to some notion of equilibria of the stage
game. Towards this, an important question that comes to mind is: Is it possible to find
Nash equilibria using uncoupled (and completely uncoupled) rules in every multi-player
game? Unfortunately the answer is negative [14], and therefore a fundamental step when
studying such rules is to distinguish between possible and impossible results. We then have
to seek a less ambitious goal (e.g. seeking correlated equilibria) or to relax the underlying
assumption (e.g. to allow limited coordination or confine the result to some games but not
all). The good news is that there are uncoupled learning rules that can reach correlated
equilibria in every game. Having all these said, one may deduce that some coordination
should be involved in either the solution concept or the learning rule.
Most of the learning rules to be considered here employ some notion of regret, per-
haps to be treated as their underlying solution concept, which tries to capture the degree
of cumulative dis-satisfaction of a player had she chosen another action. The very idea
behind such regret-based rules is to try alternative actions in some payoff-improving direc-
tions, to be signaled by the regret. The usefulness of regret is that it yields a simple and
natural way of playing as it relies on a player who is (completely) unaware of the other
players’ payoff function. Regret minimizing rules constitute a large category of rules and
we only address here some of them that can reach equilibria. The concrete theory behind
regret minimization is mainly built on Hannan-consistency and Blackwell’s approachabil-
ity, which seem to be beyond the scope of this paper and thereby will be pursued here
only partially.
Before giving the organization of the paper, we emphasize that we do not consider
2
special types of games such as potential games, supermodular games, etc. Rather, we
consider general finite multi-player games and sometimes restrict our focus to generic
multi-player games. As we already mentioned, the main concentration here is on learning
rules that converge1 to (some notions of) equilibria. We stress that this is different from
the problem of determining whether the steady state point of some learning rule in the
game of interest is an equilibrium.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we describe the game model and some
definitions regarding the notions of equilibria and convergence. In Section 3, we give some
definitions as well as results for regret and state some results for achieving correlated
equilibria in general games. Section 4 and Section 5 describe some regret-based learning
rules for correlated equilibria and mixed equilibria, respectively. Section 6 is devoted to
explain important learning rule for pure equilibria. Section 7 briefly describes fictitious
play. In Section 8, we distinguish between possibility and impossibility results for both
uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules. Finally, we discuss some benefits and
drawbacks of described learning rules as well as some open problems in Section 9.
2 Model of Game
We consider the finite normal form game represented by the triplet G = 〈N,S, pi〉 with the
mixed action2 extension G˜ = 〈N,(S), p˜i〉. The set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of
players. We assume that each player i has a finite set of pure actions Si = {1, 2, . . . ,mi}.
The n-vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) where si ∈ Si, is a pure action profile and the Cartesian
product S = i∈NSi denotes the pure action space of the game.
Let pii : S → R be the pure-action payoff function (or simply the payoff) of player i.
Here, we assume that payoffs are bounded, i.e. there exists some constant M such that
|pii(s)| ≤M for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S. Then, pi : S → Rn denotes the combined pure-action
payoff function.
The set of mixed actions of player i is ∆(Si) which is a unit simplex in Rmi where
a mixed action xi = (xih, h ∈ Si) ∈ ∆(Si) is a probability vector. The vector x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ ∆(Si), is the mixed action profile and the set (S) = i∈N∆(Si)
is the mixed action space of the game.
Besides Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, we are also interested in Nash -
equilibria which is defined next.
Definition 1 [6, 15] The pure action si ∈ Si is said to be an -best reply (with  > 0) to
s−i if
pii(si, s−i) ≥ pii(s′i, s−i)− , ∀s′i ∈ Si.
1Convergence types and notions will be defined in detail in the next section.
2Here, we use the term strategy for the repeated game and the term action for the stage game.
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Similarly, xi ∈ ∆(Si) is an -best reply to x−i if
p˜i(xi, x−i) ≥ p˜i(yi, x−i)− , ∀yi ∈ ∆(Si).
The mixed action profile x is a Nash -equilibrium if for every i ∈ N , xi is an -best reply
to x−i.
It is worthwhile to highlight that in contrast to pure and mixed Nash equilibria that
are exact points, a mixed Nash -equilibrium is not an exact point; indeed it constitutes
a set [3].
2.1 Repeated Game Setup
We denote by xti ∈ ∆(Si) the mixed action of player i at time t and by sti ∈ Si the realized
pure action at time t. Similarly xt = (xt1, . . . , x
t
n) ∈ (S) and st = (st1, . . . , stn) ∈ S
represent the mixed action profile at time t and the realized pure action profile at time t,
respectively. The history of play up to time t is denoted by Ht = (s
1, s2, . . . , st), where
sτ ∈ S is the realized action profile at time τ ≤ t.
We let oti be the observation sequence of player i up to time t that denotes the sequence
of actions and payoffs she knows or can observe up to time t. For instance, for the
case of uncoupled learning rules discussed in Section 1, the observation sequence of each
player i takes the form oti = ({sτ}τ=1,...,t, pii(.)). Also let Oti denote the set of all possible
observation sequences of player i up to time t.
The strategy of player i ∈ N is a sequence of functions fi = (f1i , f2i , . . . , f ti , . . . ) where
for each τ , f τi is a mapping f
τ
i : O
τ−1
i → ∆(Si) that assigns a mixed action to every
possible observation sequence of player i. Moreover, f = (f1, . . . , fn) denotes the strategy
profile.
2.2 Models of Learning Rules
Here we give some definitions for learning rules we consider in subsequent sections.
Definition 2 [15] A learning rule is said to be R-recall if every player conditions her play
on the last R periods of play. A strategy is said to be finite recall if such a positive integer
R exists. Then for each t > R, the function f ti admits the form f
t
i (o
t−1
i \ot−R−1i ). It is
moreover stationary if time t doesn’t matter, i.e. f ti ≡ fi(ot−1i \ot−R−1i ).
Definition 3 A learning rule is said to be finite memory if each player can implement it
by a finite automata. An R-memory learning rule is a finite memory rule such that its
automata has |S|R states [2, 15].
Similar to finite-recall rules, finite memory rules condition play on finitely many peri-
ods of history of play and therefore finite-recall rules constitute a subclass of finite memory
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rules. However, finite memory rules do not necessarily use the last periods of history, and
hence their recall can grow without bound [2].
Implication of possibility of realization of finite memory rules by finite automata is that
they can be modeled by a Markov chain with finitely many states. It’s worth mentioning
that finite-memory is a significant desired property. By contrast, infinite-memory rules
are problematic as a player who wishes them has to exploit more and more data as play
proceeds. Therefore, having finite-memory property is a natural requirement.
2.2.1 Uncoupled Learning Rules
Definition 4 A learning rule is said to be uncoupled if the strategy of each player i
depends on the payoff function of herself and the history of play of all other players.
The definition above implies that for uncoupled learning rules, the observation se-
quence of each player i takes the form oti = ({sτ}τ=1,...,t, pii(.)). Consequently, the mixed
action of player i for time t is given by xti = f
t
i (o
t−1
i ) = f
t
i ({sτ}τ=1,...,t−1, pii).
The class of uncoupled learning rules suits decentralized systems where each node is
unaware of the preference of other players3. This class of rules is rather wide. Perhaps the
most well-known uncoupled learning rule is replicator dynamics. However, many other
interesting rules are uncoupled amongst which are: best-reply, fictitious play, etc.
2.2.2 Completely Uncoupled Learning Rules
One important subclass of uncoupled rules is the class of completely uncoupled rules
defined next.
Definition 5 A learning rule is said to be completely uncoupled4 or payoff-based if the
strategy of each player only depends on her own realized payoffs and her own past actions.
In this setting, the observation sequence of each player i is oti = ({sτi , pii(sτ )}τ=1,...,t).
Consequently, the mixed action of player i for time t is given by xti = f
t
i (o
t−1
i ) =
f ti ({sτi , pii(sτ )}τ=1,...,t−1). In the case of completely uncoupled rules, each player doesn’t
know so much about the game. Indeed, she doesn’t know the number of players involved
in the game, let alone the history of their plays. Even she doesn’t know her own payoff
function completely. She only has knowledge about her realized payoffs, i.e. payoff values
she has received so far. In this setting, she views the game as a black box where she
chooses an action and receives a payoff, and that’s why these rules are sometimes called
the case of unknown game.
3Note that this setup is more restrictive than the one in which a player knows the payoff structures
involved but not the earned (realized) payoffs of the others. Indeed, in uncoupled setup, each player knows
nothing about the payoff structure of the others.
4Also referred to as radically uncoupled in [8].
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Some completely uncoupled learning rules have been proposed so far; two well-known
such rules are Trial-and-Error Learning5 [27] and (a variant of) Regret Testing [8].
2.3 Notions of Convergence to Equilibria
Here we introduce notions of convergence that will become useful when addressing learning
rules in later sections. Some of the following notions deal with the convergence of empirical
distributions of play to some equilibrium (or a set of equilibria) whereas the others imply
that the behavior of the game (or average behavior over bounded time intervals) comes
close to some equilibrium (or a set of equilibria). The formal definition of these notions
have been adopted from [28].
Before proceeding to define these notions, we mention three types of convergence. Let
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt be random variables in the same probability space (Ω,F , P ). Then,
• Yt is said to converge to Y in probability if for all  > 0,
lim
t→∞P (|Yt − Y | ≥ ) = 0.
• Yt is said to converge to Y almost surely if
P
(
lim
t→∞Yt = Y
)
= 1.
• Yt is said to converge to the set Y with frequency 1−  if {Yτ}∞τ=1 belongs to the set
Y with frequency 1−  or equivalently if
lim
t→∞ inf
|{1 ≤ τ ≤ t : Yτ ∈ Y}|
t
≥ 1− , almost surely.
Note that among the others, almost sure convergence is the strongest notion.
Now we proceed to define the notions of convergence for learning rules. For each
s ∈ S, let Φt[s] = 1t |{1 ≤ τ ≤ t : sτ = s}|. Then the empirical joint distribution of play,
also known as long run sample distribution of play and long run empirical behavior, is
defined by
(Φt[s])s∈S ∈ (S)6.
Let’s consider Φt as a vector in (S) whose sth component is Φt[s]. Let ∆∗ be a
non-empty and closed subset of (S). Then,
5To avoid confusion, particular learning rules are typeset using courier font.
6Similarly, the empirical marginal distribution of play of player i is defined as follows
(Φt[si])si∈Si ∈ ∆(Si),
where Φt[si] =
1
t
|{1 ≤ τ ≤ t : sτi = si}|.
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• Long run empirical behavior (or for short, empirical distribution) of play is said to
converge to ∆∗ if dist(Φt,∆∗)→ 0 almost surely7.
• Long run empirical behavior (empirical distribution) of play is said to converge
pointwise to ∆∗ if there exists some q ∈ ∆∗ such that Φt → q almost surely.
These notions of convergence are rather weak and do not imply that behavior or
actual play at any given point or even over a finite time interval is close to the desired
equilibrium set. A more demanding and also desirable notion is that in the short run,
behavior probabilities come close to equilibrium. In this case indeed we are interested
in the convergence of players’ behavioral strategies, instead of convergence of realizations
of those strategies. Now consider the sequence of conditional probability distributions
(q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . ) where qt = qt(.|Ht) ∈ (S) is the distribution of joint actions at time
t conditional on the history Ht. Then,
• Period-by-period behavior probabilities of play is said to converge to ∆∗ if dist(qt,∆∗)→ 0
almost surely.
• Period-by-period behavior probabilities of play is said to converge pointwise to ∆∗
if there exists some q∗ ∈ ∆∗ such that qt → q∗ almost surely.
In the sequel, “behavior probabilities” will be used to denote “period-by-period be-
havior probabilities”. It is worth mentioning that in behavior-related notions, what is
important is the convergence in terms of players’ strategic intentions, i.e. conditional
probability distributions, not the realization of those intentions. Finally, it should be em-
phasized that convergence of behavior probabilities of play is only relevant for the case of
mixed and correlated equilibria.
3 Mixed and Correlated Equilibria: Solution Concepts
As mentioned before, a plethora of uncoupled learning rules aim at minimizing some notion
of the regret or at least takes the advantage of regret as an indicator towards finding payoff-
improving action(s). The key idea behind this solution concept is to bring the cumulative
loss in payoff to the minimum.
This section is devoted to the definition of some notions of regret and their connection
to equilibria in simple setups. The simplest notion of regret, referred to as the cumulative
regret or simply regret, reflects the cumulative dissatisfaction of a player had she chosen
constantly some specific action. Formally for each player i, we define the regret with
respect to action j ∈ Si up to time t as
rit,j =
t∑
τ=1
pii(j, s
τ
−i)−
t∑
τ=1
pii(s
τ ).
7The function dist(z,A) denotes the Euclidean distance between point z and set A.
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Having defined this, now we can define the internal regret of a player.
The definition of regret above suggests its uncoupled nature, as only the own payoff
function of the player is needed for regret computation. Although regret admits a simple
definition, as we will see in Section 5, it can be used to find approximate mixed equilibria
of almost all games.
3.1 Internal Regret
Definition 6 For each player i and pair of actions j, j′, the internal regret up to time t
is defined as her payoff loss had she chosen action j′ every time she played action j, i.e.
Rint,it (j, j
′) =
∑
τ≤t:sτi =j
(pii(j
′, sτ−i)− pii(sτ )).
The concept of internal regret is powerful as it is able to capture the player’s dissatis-
faction more precisely compared to regret defined earlier. As a result, one may expect that
internal-regret-minimizing rules, i.e. rules that achieve the minimum internal regret, to be
powerful for obtaining equilibria. Internal-regret-minimizing rules have been investigated
deeply for calibration and forecasting in the course of the last decade. When employed to
play games, they are powerful enough to reach approximate correlated equilibria in every
finite game. Indeed, we have the following result.
Theorem 1 [6] In a multi-player game, if each player plays according to an internal-
regret-minimizing rule, then the distance between empirical distributions of play and the
set of correlated equilibria of game converges to zero almost surely.
One uncoupled internal-regret-minimizing rule is Regret Matching rule which will be
described in the next section.
4 Correlated Equilibria: Learning Rules
4.1 Regret Matching
Regret Matching is an uncoupled rule which is based on the minimization of internal
regret and has been proposed by Hart and Mas-Collel [12, 13]. This rule is quite simple:
at each period of play, each player establishes the vector of average internal regrets (with
respect to her current action). At the next period, she then switches to another action
with a probability that is proportional to the average internal regret of that action. This
rule is described formally below.
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Algorithm 2: Regret Matching [12, 13]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: µi ∈ (2Mi(mi − 1),∞) where Mi is an upper bound for |pii(.)|.
Initialization:
Choose a mixed action pi
(i)
0 ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly at random. Set t = 1.
Loop:
1. Play according to xti ∈ ∆(Si). Let j = sti.
2. For each pair k, j compute the average of internal regret
R
int,i
t (j, k) =
1
t
∑
τ≤t:sτi =j
(pii(k, s
τ
−i)− pii(sτ )).
3. Compute the mixed action for the next period of play
xt+1ik =
1
µi
[R
int,i
t (j, k)]
+, ∀k 6= j,
xt+1ij = 1−
∑
k∈Si,k 6=j
xt+1ik .
4. Set t = t+ 1 and repeat the loop.
For the Regret Matching rule we have the following result.
Theorem 2 [12] If every player plays according to Regret Matching procedure, then the
empirical distributions of play converge almost surely as t → ∞ to the set of correlated
equilibria of the stage game.
Figure 1 shows two sample trajectories of joint empirical distributions of Regret
Matching rule when applied to Matching Pennies game. This is consistent with statement
of Theorem 2 and confirms that long run behavior (empirical frequencies) of this rule
converges to correlated equilibria. On the other hand, behavior probabilities of Regret
Matching is not guaranteed to converge; Figure 2 depicts the moving average of empirical
distributions for Regret Matching in Matching Pennies over a window of 200 periods,
which is fixed window but rather long. This reveals that the short-run behavior of this
rule can be quite unstable and tends to spend long intervals away from the correlated
equilibrium. Therefore, Regret Matching might not converge in behavior probabilities.
4.1.1 Modified Regret Matching
Regret Matching rule is not completely uncoupled as it requires each player to know her
own payoff function and also to track the action taken by the others. This drawback can
be obviated by estimating the average internal regret as follows
9
Figure 1: Cumulative frequencies of Regret Matching in Matching Pennies game (cour-
tesy of [28])
Rˆ
int,i
t (j, k) =
1
t
∑
τ≤t:sτi =k
xτij
xτik
pii(s
τ )− 1
t
∑
τ≤t:sτi =j
pii(s
τ ).
Observe that now Rˆ
int,i
t (j, k) is only dependent on pii(s
1), . . . , pii(s
t).
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Figure 2: Short-run instabilities of Regret Matching in Matching Pennies game where
empirical averages are obtained over 100 periods (courtesy of [28])
Algorithm 2: Modified Regret Matching8 [13]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: γ ∈ (0, 1/4) and µi ∈ (2Mimi,∞) where Mi is an upper bound for
|pii(.)|.
Initialization:
Choose a mixed action pi
(i)
0 ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly at random. Set t = 1.
Loop:
1. Play according to xti ∈ ∆(Si). Let j = sti.
2. For each pair k, j compute the vector
Rˆ
int,i
t (j, k) =
1
t
∑
τ≤t:sτi =k
xτij
xτik
pii(s
τ )− 1
t
∑
τ≤t:sτi =j
pii(s
τ )
3. Compute the mixed action for the next period of play
xt+1ik = (1−
δ
tγ
) min
(
1
µi
[Rˆ
int,i
t (j, k)]
+,
1
mi
)
+
δ
mitγ
, ∀k 6= j,
xt+1ij = 1−
∑
k∈Si,k 6=j
xt+1ik
4. Set t = t+ 1 and repeat the loop.
For the Modified Regret Matching rule we have the following result.
8Parameters have been adopted from the correction to [13] published by the same authors.
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Theorem 3 [13] If every player plays according to the Modified Regret Matching pro-
cedure, then the empirical distributions of play converge almost surely as t→∞ to the set
of correlated equilibria of the stage game.
5 Mixed Equilibria: Learning Rules
In this section, we describe three variants of a procedure called Regret Testing, which
leverages regret as its underlying solution concept. Regret Testing was originally pro-
posed for two-player games by Foster and Young in [8]. In their paper, Foster and Young
showed that this procedure leads to play of Nash equilibria with frequency 1 in every
2-player game and also presented uncoupled and completely uncoupled variants of it.
Following that work, Germano and Lugosi in [11] proposed three learning rules as
extensions of Regret Testing procedure which work in any generic multi-player game.
These rules are Experimental Regret Testing and Annealed Localized Experimental
Regret Testing abbreviated here as ALERT, and Payoff-based ALERT. Moreover, they
proved that the three variants of Regret Testing can indeed yield almost sure conver-
gence of play to Nash equilibria which is stronger than convergence with frequency 1. As
we will see in the sequel, Experimental Regret Testing is not uncoupled as it requires
(uncoupled) additional information of the game to be known by the players. By contrast,
ALERT is an uncoupled rule and Payoff-based ALERT is completely uncoupled. In sub-
sequent subsections, we describe the three aforementioned variants of Regret Testing
along with some convergence results.
5.1 Experimental Regret Testing
The Experimental Regret Testing procedure works as follows. Time is partitioned into
frames, each comprising T periods. At the beginning of each frame, each player i chooses
a mixed action from ∆(Si). Then she plays according to this mixed action during the
frame (i.e. T periods). Then, at the end she computes the vector of average regrets. If
one of the elements of this vector exceeds ρ, she draws a new action uniformly at random
from ∆(Si). On the other hand, if none of the elements of this vector exceeds ρ, then,
with probability 1−λ, she continues playing according to the previous action for the next
T periods (the next frame), and with probability λ, she draws a new mixed action from
∆(Si). A more formal description of Experimental Regret Testing is depicted below.
Note that choosing λ = 0, the following procedure degenerates to the Regret Testing
procedure proposed by Foster and Young in [8].
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Algorithm 3: Experimental Regret Testing [11]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: Triple (T, ρ, λ), where T ∈ N, ρ > 0, and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization:
Choose a mixed action pi
(i)
0 ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly at random. Set t = 1.
Loop:
1. Play according to xti ∈ ∆(Si) for T periods.
2. Compute the vector of average regrets over T periods, i.e. the vector with elements
rit,k =
1
T
t+T∑
τ=t+1
(pii(k, s
τ
−i)− pii(sτ )) , k ∈ Si.
3. If rit,k ≥ ρ for some k ∈ Si, then for the next period select xt+Ti ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly
at random. If rit,k < ρ for all k ∈ Si, then with probability 1−λ, set xt+Ti = xti, and
with probability λ, choose xt+Ti ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly at random.
4. Set t = t+ T and repeat the loop.
The very idea of this procedure and also the procedure proposed by Foster and Young
in [8] is that after not a very long search period, the mixed profile xt will be a Nash
-equilibrium. At that time, since all players would have small regret, the procedure will
get stuck with this value. For Experimental Regret Testing the following result holds:
Theorem 4 [11] Let G be a generic N -player normal form game whose payoff functions
have the range [0, 1]. There exists a positive number 0 such that for all  < 0 there exist
constants c1, . . . , c4 such that if Experimental Regret Testing procedure is used with
parameters
ρ ∈ (, + c1), λ ≤ c2c3 , and T ≥ − 1
2(ρ− )2 log(c4
c3),
then for all B ≥ log(/2)log(1−λn) , we have
Pr
(
xBT /∈ XNE
) ≤ ,
where XNE denotes the set of Nash -equilibria.
It is worth mentioning that this theorem guarantees the almost sure convergence of
joint empirical distributions of play and does not assert anything regarding convergence
of behavior probabilities. Also note that in [11], another result strengthens the above to
the pointwise convergence of joint empirical distributions of play to a mixed action profile
that is in the convex hull of Nash -equilibria.
The analysis in [11] reveals some drawbacks of the Experimental Regret Testing.
The first drawback is that the speed of convergence is quite low. Indeed, O( 1
C
) rounds
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are required to reach the convergence (with probability 1− ), where C is proportional to∑
i∈N mi, i.e. proportional to the number of pure actions in the game. Hence the conver-
gence speed is exponentially slow as a function of n and mi for each player i. By contrast,
as will be discussed in Section 8, we can achieve correlated equilibria in an uncoupled way
considerably faster. The second drawback is that parameters (T, ρ, λ) depend on  and
on the properties of the overall game which might be unknown to all players. This is in
sharp contrast to the requirement of uncoupledness where these parameters should only
depend on .
5.2 Annealed Localized Experimental Regret Testing (ALERT)
In order to resolve the second drawback of Experimental Regret Testing, we consider
its variant called Annealed Localized Experimental Regret Testing (ALERT). The
idea behind this procedure is to anneal parameters (T, ρ, λ). Towards this, the proce-
dure starts with parameters (T1, ρ1, λ1) and will continue for M1 frames. Then all players
somehow change the parameters to (T2, ρ2, λ2) and play for M2 frames, and so on. If the
parameters (Tl, ρl, λl) and Ml, l = 1, 2, . . . will not depend on the parameters of the game,
we obtain an uncoupled rule.
Assume that {l}l∈N is a decreasing sequence such that l > 0, l ∈ N and
∑∞
l=1 l <∞.
For brevity, we choose l = 2
−l. Then define
λl = 
l
l, ρl = λl + l, Tl =
⌈
− 1
2λ2l
log λl
⌉
, Ml = 2
⌈
log 2l
log 11−λl
⌉
.
Also let x
[l]
i denote the mixed action played by player i at the end of (l− 1)st regime, and
Di∞(xi, δ) be l∞-ball of radius δ centered at xi. This procedure is described as follows.
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Algorithm 4:
Annealed Localized Experimental Regret Testing (ALERT) [11]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: {(Tl, ρl, λl),Ml}l∈N, where Tl,Ml ∈ N, ρl > 0, and λl ∈ (0, 1), and all
of them are dependent on positive and absolutely summable sequence {l}l∈N.
Initialization:
Choose a mixed action pi
(i)
0 ∈ ∆(Si) uniformly at random. Set t = 1.
Loop:
There are different regimes indexed by l = 1, 2, . . . . In the lth regime, play according
to loop of Experimental Regret Testing with parameters (Tl, ρl, λl) during Ml
periods (of length Tl). Instead of step 3 of Experimental Regret Testing, choose
x
t+Tl
i ∈ Xi as follows:
3a. Let rit = maxk∈Si r
i
t,k.
3b. If rit ≥ 2/3l , then select xt+Tli uniformly at random.
3c. If ρl ≤ rti < 2/3l , then select xt+Tli uniformly at random if, for some t < t′ of
the lth regime, x
t′+Tl
i has been randomly and uniformly, and otherwise select x
t+Tl
i
uniformly at random over Di∞(x
[l]
i ,
√
l).
4. Set t = t+ T and repeat the loop.
Clearly, the procedure above is uncoupled since involved parameters only depend on
{l}l∈N. For ALERT we have the following result.
Theorem 5 [11] Assume that all payoff functions in the generic n-player G admit the
compact support [0, 1]. If each player plays according to ALERT with sequence {2−l}l∈N, the
sequence of mixed action profiles converges almost surely and
lim
t→∞x
t ∈ XNE, almost surely,
where based on the randomization scheme almost sure convergence to different Nash equi-
libria can be achieved.
Note that the above theorem implies the convergence of behavior probabilities of the
game to exact equilibria. It is also worth mentioning that Experimental Regret Testing
is a T -recall (and hence finite recall) and stationary rule. By contrast, ALERT is neither
stationary nor finite-recall.
5.3 Payoff-Based ALERT
Although ALERT is an uncoupled rule, it fails the requirement of complete uncoupledness as
each player relies on the complete knowledge of her own payoff function during play. Here
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we present some modification to ALERT proposed in [11] to make it completely uncoupled.
This modification is based on the idea presented by Foster and Young in [8].
First we highlight that regret calculation is the sole point that each player needs to
have the complete knowledge of her payoff. To obtain a completely uncoupled rule, one
approach is to estimate the regret. At each time t, player i with some small probability
chooses an action uniformly at random, and with one minus this probability chooses sti
randomly according to xti.
The formal modification needed to be applied to ALERT is as follows. Each player i,
draws gi samples for each hi = 1, . . . ,mi, with gimi  T . Let Ui,τ ∈ {0} ∪ Si be random
variables for the current frame. There are exactly gi values of τ such that Ui,τ = hi and
all such configurations are equi-probable. For the remaining τ , Ui,τ = 0. At time τ , player
i draws an action sτi as follows. If Ui,τ = h, s
τ
i = h, and if Ui,τ = 0, s
τ
i is distributed
according to xτi . Then the estimated regret will be
rˆit,h =
1
gi
t+T∑
τ=t+1
1{Ui,τ=h}pii(h, s
τ
−i)−
1
T −migi
t+T∑
τ=t+1
1{Ui,τ=0}pii(s
τ ), h = 1, . . . ,mi,
and other steps are the same.
As shown in [6], if the regret of player i during the procedure will be at most  (with
 < ρ), then the probability that the estimated regret rˆit,h is greater than ρ tends to
zero as T grows large. Indeed, based on the convergence result for Payoff-based ALERT,
one can obtain the following possibility result for the pointwise convergence of behavior
probabilities of the game.
Theorem 6 [11] For all  > 0, there exists a completely uncoupled learning rule such that
the mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a profile x ∈ XNE. Moreover, in the
case of generic games, the convergence will be to a mixed action profile x ∈ XNE.
Robustness to Asynchrony. In variants of Regret Testing, it is not clear whether
the synchronization requirement between players can be relaxed or not. This might become
strictly crucial for the case of ALERT, in particular when asynchrony can lead to play
of different annealed parameters in the game. For example, a portion of players might
play with (Tl, ρl, λl) while others might play with (Tl′ , ρl′ , λl′) for some l
′ 6= l. As a
result, a challenging yet interesting question asks whether a.s. (or some weaker notion
of) convergence of the play to Nash equilibria is still possible. Our conjecture implies
that ALERT is not robust to asynchrony and as such, this learning rule might be merely
understood as a possibility result.
Which Mixed Equilibria? For games with several mixed equilibria, and in particular
those with a connected Nash component, we face an interesting question: Which mixed
equilibria are more likely to be achieved by variants of Regret Testing The procedure
itself does not provide any hint as to how this will work. We instead explored it through
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simple numerical experiments. Application of Experimental Regret Testing to Entry
Deterrence game with parameters (T = 104, ρ = 0.12, λ = 10−3) suggested that the
procedure is not able to discriminate between different mixed equilibria. Indeed, once the
procedure got stuck in an approximate mixed equilibria neighborhood, there is no chance
for other mixed equilibria to be reached. This is consistent with an statement in [11] which
says based on the realization of initial randomization, any approximate mixed equilibria
can be achieved.
6 Pure Equilibria: Learning Rules
In this section, we present three learning rules that can converge to pure equilibria. The
first two rules are naive uncoupled rules that obtain pure equilibria in general games.
Then, we present Trial-and-Error Learning [27] which is a completely uncoupled rule
to find pure equilibria in generic games.
Algorithm 5:
A Simple Uncoupled Rule for Pure Equilibria [6]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: The Boolean variable convergence.
Initialization:
Choose a pure action for player i uniformly at random. Set convergence=FALSE
and t = 1.
Loop:
1. If convergence=TRUE then repeat the action played in the last odd period.
Otherwise do:
2. If t is odd, choose an action sti randomly.
3. If t is even, let
sti =
{
1 if pii(s
t−1) ≥ maxk∈Si pi(k, st−1−i )
2 otherwise
4. If t is even and all players have played action 1, then set convergence=TRUE.
5. Set t = t+ 1 and repeat the loop.
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Algorithm 6:
Another Simple Uncoupled Rule for Pure Equilibria [15]
Strategy for player i:
Parameters: -
Initialization:
For t = 1, 2, choose a pure action for player i uniformly at random. Set t = 3.
Loop:
1. If st−1 = st−2, i.e. all players have played the same action in the last two periods,
and st−1i was a best reply to s
t−1
−i , then let s
t
i = s
t−1
i , i.e. repeat the same play.
Otherwise choose sti uniformly at random.
2. Set t = t+ 1 and repeat the loop.
If all players play according to these rules, then a pure Nash equilibrium is eventually
achieved, almost surely. This implies that almost every play path consists of a pure Nash
equilibria being played from some point on [15]. Also note that both rules are 2-recall
(and hence finite-recall); however, only the second one is stationary.
Which equilibria? Now that almost sure convergence of play to a pure equilibrium is
possible using the above mentioned uncoupled rules, one may ask: in the case of multi-
plicity of pure equilibria, which one is more likely to be achieved by these procedures?
Clearly, using these rules, convergence of play to a pure equilibrium is based on random
play. Hence, in case of having multiple pure equilibria, based on the realization of ran-
dom play any of them might be the convergent action profile in an equi-probable way.
Therefore, the two simple procedures presented above cannot distinguish between or be
biased towards any of pure equilibria. As a result, they are blind to discriminate between
particular kinds of pure equilibria.
6.1 Trial-and-Error Learning
Trial-and-Error Learning is a completely uncoupled learning rule that can reach pure
equilibria in generic games [27]. Here we describe Trial-and-Error Learning proposed
by Young in [27]. A slightly modified variant of this rule is also presented by Pradelski
and Young in [22] that amongst multiple pure equilibria obtains the one that maximizes
the welfare of the game.
First we describe Trial-and-Error Learning. At a given time moment, the state of
player i is the triple zi = (Mi, si, pii), where si is the current benchmark action of i, pii is
the current benchmark payoff of i, and Mi is the current mood of i, with possible values
being content, discontent, hopeful, and watchful, respectively symbolized by c, d, h, and w
in the sequel. Also assume that φ(a, b) is a function which is monotone increasing in a
and monotone decreasing in b. Then, Trial-and-Error Learning rule for player i can
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be described as follows. To proceed, we indeed consider player i in different moods and
describe possible state transitions.
1. When content (Mi = c), the player tries new actions at each time with probability
 (which yields action si with payoff pii(s) for her), and with probability 1 −  she
continues playing with si. Then she changes her state as follows
• zi = (c, si, pii) if si 6= si, pii(s) ≤ pii,
• zi = (c, si, pii(s)) if si 6= si, pii(s) > pii,
• zi = (w, si, pii) if si = si, pii(s) < pii,
• zi = (c, si, pii) if si = si, pii(s) = pii,
• zi = (h, si, pii) if si = si, pii(s) > pii.
2. When watchful (Mi = w), she plays her benchmark action si. At each time, she
changes her state as follows
• zi = (d, si, pii) if pii(s) < pii,
• zi = (c, si, pii) if pii(s) = pii,
• zi = (h, si, pii) if pii(s) > pii.
3. When hopeful (Mi = h), she plays her benchmark action si. At each time, she
changes her state as follows
• zi = (w, si, pii) if pii(s) < pii,
• zi = (c, si, pii) if pii(s) = pii,
• zi = (c, si, pii(s)) if pii(s) > pii.
4. When discontent (Mi = d), she selects an action uniformly at random and changes
her state as follows
• zi = (c, si, pii(s)) with probability φ(pii(s), pii),
• zi = (d, si, pii) with probability 1− φ(pii(s), pii).
Now, we investigate the convergence of Trial-and-Error Learning. First we define
the notion of interdependence in normal form games.
Definition 7 [27] A game G is said to be interdependent if any subset K ⊂ N of players
can influence the payoff of at least one player not in K, or equivalently
∃i /∈ K, ∃s′K 6= sK such that pii(s′K , s−K) 6= pii(sK , s−K),
where sK is the restriction of s to the set K.
Interestingly, for generic games interdependence holds. Note, however, that inter-
dependence can still hold in games with some payoff ties (and hence non-generic) and
therefore, interdependence is a less demanding requirement.
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φ1(a, b) = φ2(a, b) = φ3(a, b) =
[0.001a− 0.05b+ 0.95]0.990.01 [0.6a− 0.1b+ 0.05]0.990.01 [0.2a− 0.4b+ 0.15]0.990.01
freq. of P1 0.471(1− ) 0.718(1− ) 0.125(1− )
freq. of P2 0.529(1− ) 0.282(1− ) 0.875(1− )
Table 1: Experimental results for Trial-and-Error Learning with  = 0.01 in Entry Deterrence game
Theorem 7 [27] Let G be an interdependent n-player game that has at least one pure
Nash equilibrium. If players use Trial-and-Error Learning with experimentation prob-
ability  and function φ, then for all sufficiently small , Trial-and-Error Learning rule
converges to pure equilibria with frequency 1 − , i.e. pure Nash equilibria will be played
at least 1 −  of the time. For the case of n = 2 the interdependence condition can be
removed.
Which equilibria? Having presented the convergence result for Trial-and-Error Learning
rule, we then investigate the answer to this question for multiplicity of pure equilibria.
To this effect, we did some numerical experiments for several classical two-player games
with multiple equilibria (e.g. Battle-of-the-sexes, Entry Deterrence, Coordination). As
all cases yielded the same conclusion, here we only report the result for Entry Deterrence
game. Consider Entry Deterrence game with payoff bi-matrix
( 2,2 0,0
1,4 1,4
)
, which has two
pure equilibria. Let P1 and P2 respectively denote the pure equilibria with payoff pairs
2, 2 and 1, 4.
We carried out experiments with  = 0.01 and three different choices of function φ, all
admitting the format φ(a, b) = [pa − qb + c]yx with p, q > 0 and [z]yx being the projection
operator onto [x, y]. Table 1 lists frequencies of choosing P1 and P2 averaged over 200
experiments, each lasting 5×104 periods. This result shows that using φ1, both equilibria
are almost equi-probable. However, either P1 or P2 is more likely to be achieved if φ2 or
φ3 has been used. Yet we can construct another function φ which results in play of P1
with an average frequency greater than those reported in Table 1 (the statement holds for
P2 as well).
It is worthwhile to mention that the work [27] only requires φ(a, b) to be increasing
in a and decreasing in b. While it provides no other clues for choosing φ, it stresses that
convergence is guaranteed under any choice of φ satisfying these requirements. Finally, as
our extensive experiments verify, the choice of φ influences the equilibrium that is likely
to be achieved had the game possessed multiple pure equilibria. Therefore, unlike the
two uncoupled procedures in the previous subsection, Trial-and-Error Learning is not
blind; rather it can be adjusted, perhaps in quite a complicated and tricky way, to converge
to a certain equilibrium most of time. It, however, remains an interesting open question
which format should φ admit such that convergence to, e.g. a proper equilibrium, to be
more likely.
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It should be mentioned, however, that using some modifications, one can obtain a
variant of Trial-and-Error Learning such that, in games with multiple pure equilibria,
it converges with frequency 1 −  to a pure equilibria with the highest social welfare9.
This is indeed the completely uncoupled procedure proposed by Pradelski and Young [22],
which converges with frequency 1−  to arg maxs is PNE
∑
i∈N pii(s).
7 Fictitious Play
Perhaps fictitious play is amongst the first uncoupled rules invented for repeated play
of games. In order to keep the scope of this report unified, we will not pay too much
attention to this rule and its variants. However, as an uncoupled rule, here we will briefly
investigate its appeal and its drawback for the sake of completeness.
In fictitious play, at time t, each player i chooses an action that is a best response to
empirical distribution up to time t− 1:
sti = arg max
h∈Si
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
pii(h, s
τ
−i).
Fictitious play is not guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibria for general games.
Indeed for the general case, even convergence to the set of correlated equilibria may not
be achieved using this rule (see e.g. [6]). However, for the case of two-player zero-sum
games, it has been shown in [23], that using fictitious play, the joint empirical distributions
of play converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Within decades, several variants of fictitious play such as smoothed fictitious play,
vanishingly smoothed fictitious play have been proposed (see e.g. [10, 6]). In particular, in
[18], Hofbauer and Sandholm proposed stochastic fictitious play for which the convergence
to Nash equilibria can be guaranteed.
8 Demarcating Possible and Impossible
As discussed earlier, a fundamental step when dealing with simple uncoupled and com-
pletely uncoupled learning rules is to distinguish between what is possible and what is
not. In the course of the last decade, several works paid attention to explore the border
between possibilities and impossibilities for coupled and completely uncoupled learning
rules (see e.g. [3, 17, 14, 27, 11]). Here, we briefly reflect the main results.
8.1 Uncoupled Rules
Pure Nash Equilibria
9The social welfare of action profile s is
∑
i∈N pii(s).
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• There exist no uncoupled, 1-recall, stationary learning rules that lead to a.s. con-
vergence of play to pure Nash equilibria for all games (e.g. [15], Theorem 1).
• There exist uncoupled, 1-recall, stationary rules that can lead to a.s. convergence of
play to pure Nash equilibria in all generic two-player games ([15], Proposition 2).
• There exist uncoupled, 2-recall, stationary rules that can lead to a.s. convergence of
play to pure Nash equilibria in all games ([15], Theorem 3). One instance of such
uncoupled learning rules has been outlined as Algorithm 6.
Mixed Nash -Equilibria
• For every M and  > 0, there exists an integer R and an uncoupled, R-recall,
stationary rule that can lead to a.s. convergence of empirical distributions of play to
Nash -equilibria in all games. For almost every history of play, there exists a Nash
-equilibrium x such that for every combination of s ∈ S,
lim
t→∞Φt[s] =
∏
i∈N
xi(si), almost surely.
Moreover, there exists an almost surely finite stopping time T after which we have
([15], Theorem 5):
lim
t→∞Pr(s
t = s|HT ) =
∏
i∈N
xi(si), almost surely.
Note, however, that it does not imply the convergence of behavior probabilities of
the play.
• There exists 0 (dependent on n and mi, i ∈ N) such that for every  < 0, there are
no uncoupled, finite recall, stationary rules that lead to a.s. convergence of behavior
probabilities to Nash -equilibria in all games ([15], Theorem 6).
• For every  > 0, there exist integer R and an uncoupled, R-memory, stationary rule
that leads to a.s. convergence of behavior probabilities of play to Nash -equilibria
in all games. ([15], Theorem 7)
8.2 Completely Uncoupled Rules
Pure Nash Equilibria
• There are no completely uncoupled rules that lead to a.s. convergence of play to
pure Nash equilibria, in all games. This statement holds true even if we restrict the
attention to generic games ([3], Corollary 1).
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• There are no completely uncoupled rules that lead to play of pure Nash equilibria
in all games, even for convergence with frequency 1 −  ([3], Theorem 3). For the
latter, however, for all two-player games, there exists such a rule: Trial-and-Error
Learning [27].
• There is a completely uncoupled rule that leads to play of pure Nash equilibria in all
interdependent (and hence generic) games, with frequency 1 − . The only known
rule satisfying this statement Trial-and-Error Learning [27].
• Under some (uncoupled) additional information, that include either the knowledge
of the number of players n or the index of each player i, there exists a completely
uncoupled rule that leads to a.s. convergence of play to pure Nash equilibria in all
generic games ([3], Theorem 4).
• Even under (uncoupled) additional information described above, there are no com-
pletely uncoupled rules that lead to play of pure Nash equilibria with frequency 1−
in all games ([3], Corollary 3).
Mixed Nash -Equilibria
• There exist completely uncoupled learning rules that lead to a.s. convergence of
behavior probabilities of play to an -equilibrium in every generic game ([3], Theorem
5). One such rule is Payoff-based ALERT [11].
• There exist completely uncoupled rules that lead to convergence of behavior proba-
bilities of play to an -equilibrium in all games with frequency 1 −  ([3], Theorem
6)10.
• There are no completely uncoupled rules realizable with finite-memory that lead to
a.s. convergence of behavior probabilities of play to -equilibria in all games ([3],
Theorem 7).
We note that pure Nash equilibria are exact points. By contrast a mixed Nash -
equilibrium is not an exact point; indeed it constitutes a set. Therefore, if occasionally we
reach a pure Nash equilibrium, using completely uncoupled rules it is impossible to stay
there thereafter. On the other hand, it is possible to get stuck in mixed Nash -equilibria
while players are still searching.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results presented in this section. The identifier ‘N/A’
denotes open issues.
10It is unclear whether that Payoff-based ALERT satisfies this requirement [11].
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uncoupled uncoupled completely uncoupled completely uncoupled
(1-recall, (R≥2-recall, (with additional
stationary) stationary) information)
a.s. conv.
all: 7 all: 3 all: 7 all: 7
generic (n = 2): 3 - generic: 7 generic: 3
freq. 1−  all: N/A all: 3 all: 7 all: 7
generic: N/A - generic: 3 generic: 3
Table 2: Summary of possibilities and impossibilities for pure Nash equilibria
uncoupled uncoupled completely
(finite-recall) (finite-memory) uncoupled
behavior (a.s. conv.)
all: 7 all: 3 all: 7
generic: N/A - generic: 3
distribution (a.s. conv.)
all: 3 all: 3 all: 7
- - generic: 3
distribution (freq. 1− ) all: 3 all: 3 all: 3
- - -
Table 3: Summary of possibilities and impossibilities for approximate mixed equilibria
8.3 Time Efficiency
Here we briefly address complexity of reaching equilibria using uncoupled rules. In general
we are interested in time-efficient learning rules, where time efficiency is defined as follows:
A learning rule is time-efficient if the time it takes to converge to equilibria is polynomial
in the number of players.
If we were to find correlated -equilibria of the game, the communication complexity
would be [6]:
max
i∈N
16min
2
log
min
δ
with probability at least 1− δ,
which is polynomial in game parameters (i.e. n and mi, i ∈ N) and is proportional
to 1
2
. This implies that approximate correlated equilibria for every finite game can be
found using time-efficient uncoupled rules. This is in sharp contrast to the fact that as
of today, no polynomial-time algorithm is known to find approximate Nash equilibria in
every game [7, 16]. In particular, for communication complexity of uncoupled rules to find
pure equilibria, we have the following impossibility result.
Theorem 8 [16] There are no time-efficient uncoupled learning rules that reach a pure
Nash equilibrium in all games where such equilibria exist.
Comparing the communication complexity of reaching approximate correlated equi-
libria and the assertion of theorem above motivates us to further explore such a dramatic
difference in communication complexity of reaching correlated and Nash equilibria. As
postulated by Hart [17], this is in line with the fact that correlated equilibria are solutions
of linear inequalities whereas Nash equilibria are fixed points of nonlinear mappings. One
24
conclusion is that correlated equilibria is a “dynamically easy” concept while Nash equilib-
ria is a “dynamically hard” one. This conclusion along with impossibility results outlined
above inherently implies the law of conservation of coordination, which was coined perhaps
by Sergiu Hart: In a general setup, the need for coordination cannot be removed; it should
be embedded in either the solution concept (as in the case for correlated equilibria) or the
underlying learning rule.
9 Discussion
This section is devoted to discuss some pitfalls of learning rules discussed so far.
Which Equilibria? One important question regarding learning rules discussed so far is
the type of equilibria that is achieved (or is more likely to be achieved) had the underlying
game possessed multiple equilibria. We addressed this question in earlier sections. To
summarize,
• For learning pure equilibria using Trial-and-Error Learning, the choice of func-
tion φ proves capable of influencing the learning rule to decide in favor of one equi-
libria most of the time. However, it is unclear how to choose φ such that a perfect
or proper equilibrium to be selected most of the time (and in all games).
• For the case of mixed equilibria, regret based learning procedures discussed so far
are blind in distinguishing between different (approximate) mixed equilibria. All
approximate mixed equilibria are attainable in an equi-probable way.
Pareto Efficiency. Learning rules discussed so far do not imply whether an efficient
profile11 will be reached. Achieving efficient action profiles is an issue of great concern when
considering system level objectives and has great implications in engineering disciplines.
To our best knowledge, the only completely uncoupled learning rule that guarantees the
convergence to an efficient pure equilibria is a variant of Trial-and-Error Learning
presented by Pradelski and Young [22]. However, we are unaware of the existence of
uncoupled learning rules that converge to efficient mixed action profiles.
Susceptibility to Delayed and Inexact Observations, and Asynchrony. Both
uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules are appropriate models for decentral-
ized decision making. An inherent feature of such systems is that each player is informed
of her payoff after some delay usually modeled as a random process. Another inherent
feature is the possibility of inexact information, which means that players might receive
noisy observation sequence.
One interesting question that may arise is: For the case of possible results, is it still
possible to reach equilibria using delayed payoffs? Is it possible to allow players to take
11In terms of the social welfare function of the game
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their actions based on inexact observations? To the best of our knowledge, the majority
of previous studies dealt with players being informed of their payoffs in a delay-free and
noise-free manner. The only closely related work is perhaps the working paper by Lagziel
and Lehrer [19], in which they address the possibility of reaching (correlated) equilibria
under some restrictions for delay. Another distantly related work might be the work by
Sandholm [24].
Another issue which is relevant for the case of learning procedure that has a frame
structure (in particular ALERT) is susceptibility to asynchrony. In particular, for ALERT
asynchrony can lead to play of different annealed parameters in the game. For example, a
portion of players might play with (Tl, ρl, λl) while others that joined later to the process
might play with (Tl′ , ρl′ , λl′) for some l
′ 6= l. As a result, a challenging yet interesting
question asks whether a.s. (or some weaker notion of) convergence of the play to Nash
equilibria is still possible. Our conjecture implies that ALERT is not robust to asynchrony
and as such, this learning rule might be merely understood as a possibility result.
Exploiting Payoff Structure. All learning rules discussed above are quite close to
exhaustive search. As a result, their worst case convergence time (for the general case)
grows exponentially as a function of parameters involved in the game. With the exception
of potential games, it is not clear whether specific mathematical structures in the pay-
off functions involved (like supermodularity) will prove helpful in devising more efficient
learning rules.
Being Unreasonable. It is mentioned earlier that cognitive optimization degree re-
quirement of learning rules of interest is greater than that of evolutionary dynamics and
less than that of fully rational learning. One drawback associated to our learning rules
is that they are not reasonable, rationalizable, etc. They just try to implement a search
procedure that is a bit smarter than exhaustive search. More importantly, they do not
try to exploit the correlation between players through the payoff function. As such they
fail to reflect realistic decision process of players with bounded rationality.
It seems promising to explore rules that lie between our learning rules and fully
rational learning in the spectrum of cognitive optimization of learning procedures. It
seems that these smarter rules to be capable of improving upon serious drawbacks of
our rules, and consequently to be able to capture decision making of boundedly rational
players more precisely.
Connection to Information Theory We can think of drawbacks and impossibility
results of both uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules as a result of bounded
rationality. In particular, recall in Section 8 where we restricted the uncoupled rules
to be finite-memory or even finite-recall. These are inherent restrictions of players of
players with bounded rationality. Although some information-theoretic results for non-
cooperative game theory with players with bounded rationality have been established
in [26], as of today no result targeting information-theoretic impossibility of uncoupled
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learning rules has been observed. One possible road is to investigate impossibilities in
light of information theory though it sounds like a hope.
9.1 Lessons Learned
So far, we have considered several uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules that
can reach different types of equilibria in almost all finite games. The essential concern
of this paper, however, was not to provide a list of such rules. Rather, our first concern
was to address the possibility of reaching (Nash or correlated) equilibria using (possibly
simple) learning rules that rely on players with limited observability (i.e. uncoupledness
and completed uncoupledness). Second, it aimed to present the solution concepts upon
which such learning rules were built.
For correlated equilibria, we have seen the existence of time-efficient uncoupled and
completely uncoupled learning rules that work in every finite game. The discussion in the
previous sections also showed that such rules have an appealing communication complexity
as a function of number of players and their pure actions. As for their underlying solution
concept, the notion of internal regret proved valuable.
By contrast, it was understood that there exist no uncoupled learning rules that
guarantee almost sure convergence of play of Nash equilibria in all finite games. Some
refinements of the main question then emerged: Are there uncoupled learning rules that
guarantee almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria in all generic games? Are there
uncoupled learning rules to obtain convergence to Nash equilibria with frequency 1−  in
all games?
Although the answers to many questions like these are negative (e.g., results in Section
8), some works answered to some of them in the affirmative by providing appropriate
rules (e.g. [11, 27]). Note, however, that for the case of positive answers, in a plethora
of situations such rules do not exhibit elegant convergence behavior and as of today they
might be considered solely as possibility results.
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